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Abstract
This study investigates the types and characteristics of firms with politically connected 
directors in the boards of the company. The study uses data from all firms listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange spanning from 2004 to 2006. This study employs univariate 
analyses to address the research questions. The finding shows that firms with politi-
cal connections are prevalence in chemical, infrastructure, investment, and miscella-
neous industry. Furthermore, firm size is the only variable which significantly affects 
the probability of being politically connected firms. Specifically, larger firms are more 
likely to be politically connected. This study implies that the size of the firms is an im-
portant determinant in establishing political connections in Indonesia.
Iman Harymawan (Indonesia), Dian Agustia (Indonesia),  
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INTRODUCTION
Prior studies find that firms with political connections in emerging 
countries receive some special benefits from their connections (Faccio, 
2006). Other studies have also found that political connections will 
affect the firms’ decision-making process and outcomes. Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find that the changes of the political power 
map influence the proportion and source of debt of politically connect-
ed firms. Fisman (2001) shows that politically connected firms share 
price is affected by the health issue/news of the connected politicians.
Despite the significant impact of being politically connected for 
the companies, however, only a few studies discuss the industrial 
distribution and characteristics of politically connected firms in 
specific countries (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; Gray, Harymawan, 
& Nowland, 2016). This study examine the distributions and char-
acteristics of politically connected firms in Indonesia. We employ 
political connections data from Faccio (2006) to measure political 
connections in Indonesia. We are particularly interested in investi-
gating this issue using these data, because this database was wide-
ly used in international publications. The study period covered in 
this study is spanning from 2004 to 2006 and employ simple firm 
characteristics analysis to address the hypothesis. The software 
used for data processing is STATA.
This study finds that around 9.4 percent of firms-year observations 
are politically connected. Interestingly, connected firms are more 
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pronounced in chemical, infrastructure, investment, and miscellaneous industry. Furthermore, 
the results show that larger firms are significantly and positively associated with politically con-
nected firms. This result implies that in Indonesia, larger firms are more likely to establish political 
connections to support their business. However, we find no significant association between politi-
cal connections to firm performance, debt structure, and firm’s liquidity. The results of this study 
further enhance our knowledge on the distributions and characteristics of politically connected 
firms in Indonesia.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the developing countries, prior research 
finds there are some costs and benefits of being 
politically connected firms. From the benefits 
perspective, previous studies which found that 
firms with politically connected directors are 
by Wu, Wu, Zhou, and Wu (2012) who look at 
the impact of political connections on tax ben-
efits and firm performance in China. Their re-
sults show that firms with politically connected 
managers are more likely to have better firm 
performance and enjoy tax benefits. Minggui, 
Yafu, and Hongbo (2010) find that connected 
firms in China earn more fiscal subsidies than 
the counterparts. Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou 
(2008) find that private firms that join member-
ship of party in China will have better perfor-
mance and more access to loan.
From the cost point of view, prior findings re-
veal that firms with political connections are 
more likely to appoint a high quality of auditor 
and pay higher audit fees. Gul (2006) investi-
gates the relations between political connections 
and audit fees. He found that connected firms 
in Malaysia pay higher audit fee than non-con-
nected ones. He argues that the auditor needs to 
provide higher effort when auditing connected 
firms, since these firms have a higher risk of 
financial misstatements. Interestingly, he also 
found that the audit fee charged by the auditor 
will decline when the government introduced 
capital controls to assist the connected firms. 
Another study from Aswadi Abdul Wahab, Zain, 
and James (2011) examines the effect of political 
connections on the relationship between corpo-
rate governance and audit fees. Their results 
show that connected firms with better corpo-
rate governance pay higher audit fees than other 
firms. Bliss and Gul (2012) find that connected 
firms in Malaysia are more likely to have higher 
leverage, higher likelihood of reporting a loss, 
and higher likelihood to having negative equity. 
They argue that these situation are associated 
that connected firms in Malaysia are perceived 
as being of higher risk by the market and the 
auditor.
Political connections research on the developed 
countries shows the mixed findings. Correia 
(2014) finds that connected firms in United 
States are less likely to be involved on SEC en-
forcement actions. She also found that the con-
nected firms have lower penalties when they 
are prosecuted by the SEC. Blau, Brough, and 
Thomas (2013) find that connected firms in 
United States are more likely to receive more 
and earlier support from the government when 
they face financial problem. Interestingly, Gray, 
Harymawan, and Nowland (2016) finds that the 
appointment of politically connected directors 
for firms in Australia is associated with nega-
tive market reactions. 
Furthermore, being politically connected firms 
also affect the decision making and outcomes of 
the firms. Fisman (2001) finds that in Indonesia, 
the share price of firms connected to Soeharto 
(former president of Indonesia) is inf luenced by 
the health issues of the President. When there is 
a good news related to the health of the President, 
the share price of the connected firms will in-
crease significantly. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 
(2006) extended the study from Fisman (2001) 
by investigating the relations between the fi-
nancing strategy of the firms connected to 
Soeharto. They found that connected firms are 
less likely to have publicly traded foreign se-
curities. Interestingly, after Soeharto stepped 
down, the connected firms are more likely to 
increase their foreign financing. Chaney, Faccio, 
and Parsley (2011) show that firms with politi-
cal connections are more opaque than non-con-
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nected ones. Harymawan and Nowland (2016) 
also found that some country indicators (i.e., 
government effectiveness and political stability) 
could affect the association between political 
connections and earnings quality of connected 
firms in Indonesia.
Also, some international studies on political 
connections also provide interesting findings. 
Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2008) examine 
the impact of political connections in privatized 
firms. They found that newly privatized firms 
are associated with higher leverage and more 
pronounced in the regulated industry. Boubakri, 
Cosset, and Saffar (2012) investigate the firm’s 
operating performance and financing decision 
of politically connected firms. Their finding 
shows that connected firms enjoy a benefit on 
easier access to credit and their connections can 
help them to increase their performance. Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find that con-
nected firms are more likely to be bailed out 
when the home country of the firm’s head-
quarters received aid from the International 
Monetary Fund or the World Bank. 
2. HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
According to Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2013), 
the politically connected firms have easier ac-
cess to get the government contract. This means 
that the firms use their political connections 
to win the tender for the contract of the gov-
ernment’s project, for example, in infrastruc-
ture. The industry from infrastructure sectors 
which have a political background on their 
board of directors will use their connections to 
make the firm get easier access to the project in 
infrastructure. 
Moreover, Krueger (1974) stated that the firm 
uses their political connections to get access 
to regulation on export import license. In 
Indonesia, mining and agriculture are the ex-
amples of industry sectors that conduct the 
export-import activities. From that standpoint, 
we argue that the political connections are more 
pronounced in that industry. Because, the firm 
will use their connections to make the regula-
tion regarding export-import license, which can 
make the firm easier to get profit and facilitate 
the export-import activities. Therefore, hypoth-
esis 1 is as follows:
H1: The politically connected firms are more 
pronounced in agriculture, mining, and 
infrastructure sector.
Although the politically connected firms are eas-
ier to win the contract, but to make sure that the 
government project regarding infrastructure is 
running well and the output is satisfied, the gov-
ernment will have some consideration in choos-
ing the firms to conduct the project. The govern-
ment will choose the big firm which expected to 
give the best result for the project. Furthermore, 
we argue that leverage, ROA, and liquidity ratio 
also become the consideration for the govern-
ment to choose the firm. Based on the findings 
from Faccio (2010), the result shows that the po-
litically connected firms have a larger size and 
higher leverage than non-connected ones. From 
that standpoint, hypotheses 2 are as follows:
H2a: The politically connected firms have bigger 
firm size than non-connected firms.
H2b: The politically connected firms have higher 
leverage than non-connected firms.
H2c: The politically connected firms have a high-
er liquidity ratio than non-connected firms.
H2d: The politically connected firms have a lower 
return on assets than non-connected firms.
3. DATA AND VARIABLE 
MEASUREMENT
3.1. Sample and data sources
This study uses 759 firm-year observations which 
consist of all firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
for the period 2004–2006. All financial data used in 
this study are obtained from the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) websites. For political connections 
measurement, this study uses the list of politically 
connected firms in Indonesia from Faccio (2006). 
20
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There are 72 firm-year observations matched with 
the list of politically connected firms from Faccio 
(2006), which means that the firm has political 
connections. This result will leave 687 firms as 
non-politically connected firms. All of the politi-
cally connected firms in our sample are connected 
through ownership or the directors by a minister, 
police officer, army, members of political parties 
or someone related to them.
3.2. Variable measurement
The variable of political connections is labeled 
as PCON. The value for this variable is 0 and 
1. The value of 1 indicates that the firm is cat-
egorized as politically connected firms, which 
match with the list of politically connected 
firms from Faccio (2006). The value of 0 means 
that the firms is categorized as non-politically 
connected firms. 
The variable of firm size, which is labeled as SIZE, 
is calculated by the natural logarithm (Ln) of to-
tal assets. Leverage ratio (LEV) is calculated as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Return on 
Assets (ROA) calculated as the ratio of net income 
for the current year to total assets. Liquidity ratio 
(CASH) calculated as the ratio of cash holdings to 
total assets.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULT
4.1. Firm distribution with political 
connection
Politically connected firms distribution for 
firm listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange’s per 
industry. 
Table 1 represents the number of politically 
connected firms in each industry sector for the 
firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for 
the period 2004–2006. The largest number of 
politically connected firms come from the in-
dustry sector of basic industry and chemical, 
miscellaneous industry, and trade, service and 
investment with 18 politically connected firms 
for each industry. Followed by the industry sec-
tor of consumer goods industry; property, real 
estate and building and infrastructure, utilities 
and transportation with six politically connect-
ed firms in each sector.
The industry sector, which doesn’t have po-
litically connected firms come from agriculture, 
mining and finance sector. From 759 firm-year 
observations, 72 are politically connected firms, 
and the rest of 687 firm-year observations are non-
politically connected firms.
Table 1. Firm distribution
Sector Firms % of connection
Agriculture
No connection 26 100
connections 0 0
Total 26 100
Mining
No connection 55 100
Connections 0 0
Total 55 100
Basic industry and chemicals
No connection 119 86.86
Connections 18 13.13
Total 137 100
Miscellaneous industries
No connection 80 81.63
Connections 18 18.36
Total 98 100
Consumer goods industry
No connection 83 93.26
Connections 6 6.74
Total 89 100
Property, real estate, and building
No connection 78 92.86
Connections 6 7.14
Total 84 100
Infrastructure, utilities and transportation
No connection 55 90.16
Connections 6 9.84
Total 61 100
Finance
No connection 6 100
Connections 0 0
Total 6 100
Trade, service, and investment
No connection 185 91.13
Connections 18 8.87
Total 203 100
Total
No connection 687 90.51
Connections 72 9.49
Total 759 100
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4.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
SIZE 11.140 11.054 1.649 7.529 15.380
LEV 0.339 0.270 0.364 0.000 2.302
ROA 0.016 0.021 0.113 –0.568 0.306
CASH 0.074 0.046 0.081 0.001 0.365
Note: Descriptive statistics for 759 firm-year observations 
from firm listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 
2004–2006.
Table 2 represents the descriptive statistics for the 
variable used in this study. The mean statistics of 
firm-size (SIZE) is 11.140. It means that on average, 
the size of the firm used in this research is relative-
ly big. The leverage ratio on average has the debt of 
0.339 to the total assets, which is calculated in LEV 
variable. The mean of ROA variable and CASH vari-
able in this study is 0.016 and 0.074, respectively. 
4.3. Pearson correlation
Table 3. Pearson correlation
Variable PCON SIZE LEV ROA CASH
PCON 1.000 – – – –
SIZE
0.143*** 1.000 – – –
(0.000) – – – –
LEV
0.016 0.056 1.000 – –
(0.665) (0.126) – – –
ROA
–0.002 0.281*** –0.348*** 1.000 –
(0.959) (0.000) (0.000) – –
CASH
0.036 0.099*** –0.253*** 0.329*** 1.000
(0.324) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) –
Note: Pearson correlation for 759 firm-year observations from 
firm listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2004–
2006. Significance level at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 3 represents the correlation coefficient and 
the significance level of correlation between the 
variables used in this study. As expected, the corre-
lation between PCON and SIZE is positive and sig-
nificant, indicating that politically connected firms 
are associated with high firm size. It indicates that 
the firm size of politically connected firms is bigger 
than non-politically connected firms. 
In contrast, there is no significant relationship be-
tween PCON with LEV, ROA, and CASH. It means 
that the politically connected firms and non-polit-
ically connected firms for firms listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange for the period 2004–2006 relatively 
have the same characteristics with regards to their le-
verage ratio, return on assets and liquidity ratio.
4.4. Firm characteristics
Table 4. Firm characteristics
Variable
Connection No Connection
Coef. t-value
N = 72 N = 687
SIZE 11.867 11.063 0.804*** 3.974
LEV 0.357 0.337 0.020 0.433
ROA 0.015 0.016 –0.001 –0.051
CASH 0.083 0.073 0.010 0.986
Note: Independent t-test  for 759 firm-year observations from 
firm listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2004–
2006. Significance level at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 4 presents the firm characteristics between 
politically connected and non-politically connect-
ed firms. This independent t-test used 759 year-
firms as the samples to determine if there are dif-
ferences between politically connected firms and 
non-politically connected firms. We divide into 
two groups: connection and no connection groups, 
which has 72 and 687 firm-year observations, re-
spectively. Based on the table above, the mean val-
ue of SIZE for politically connected firms is 11.867 
with the total of observations are 72 year-firms. 
For non-politically connected firms which con-
sist of 687 firm-year observations, the mean value 
from t-test above is 11.063. The coefficient of SIZE 
is 0.804 and significant at the 1% level. This result 
indicates that the firm size of politically connect-
ed firms is significantly different and bigger than 
non-politically connected firms.
On the other hand, the result shows that there are 
no significant differences between politically con-
nected and non-politically connected firms with 
regards to LEV, ROA, and CASH for the firms 
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 
2004–2006. It means that the firm characteristics 
of politically connected firms and non-politically 
connected firms are relatively same with regards 
to their leverage, return on assets and liquidity ra-
tio. On the other hand, the result shows that there 
are no significant differences between politically 
connected and non-politically connected firms 
with regards to LEV, ROA, and CASH for the 
firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 
period 2004–2006. It indicates that the firm char-
acteristics of politically connected firms and non-
politically connected firms are relatively same 
with regards to their leverage, return on assets and 
liquidity ratio.
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CONCLUSION
This study investigates the distributions and characteristics of politically connected firms in Indonesia, 
a country with strong political influence in business. This study uses the list of politically connected 
firms from Faccio (2006) to measure political connections and all of the firms listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange for the period 2004–2006 as the observations. The initial results shows that the connected 
firms in Indonesia are more pronounced in chemical, infrastructure, investment, and miscellaneous 
industry. This study also shows that political connections have a positive and significant relationship 
with firm size. This finding indicates that the politically connected firms are associated with larger size 
of the firms. In contrast, flip with prior findings, there is no significant relationship between political 
connections and leverage, return on assets and liquidity ratio. Hence, there is no difference on the char-
acteristics between politically connected firms and non-connected firms in regards to leverage, return 
on assets and liquidity ratio. The results of this study further enhance our knowledge on the distibutions 
and characteristics of politically connected firms in Indonesia.
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